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INTRODUCTION
Appellee/cross-appellant/defendant and third party plaintiff
Zandra Perkins ("Perkins") hereby files her Reply Brief in Support
of her Cross Appeal and in Opposition to the Appeal of Plaintiff/
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Kent L. Frampton ("Frampton") . This Reply
Brief contains the following argument sections:
1.

Reply to (a) Appellee Bear River Mutual Insurance

Company's ("Bear River") brief in opposition to issues raised by
Perkins in her appeal and (b) to Appellant/Cross-Appellee First
General Services ("First General Services") brief in opposition to
issues raised by Perkins in her appeal; and
2.

Perkins's brief in opposition to Frampton7s Appeal.

I.
PERKINS'S REPLY TO BEAR RIVER'S AND TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICES'S
BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION TO ISSUES RAISED BY PERKINS ON APPEAL
Bear River and First General Services have made essentially
the same arguments in opposition to Perkins's appeal. Therefore,
although objections to Bear River's statement of facts and to First
General Services's statement of facts are set forth separately
below, Perkins's reply argument is made in response to arguments
advanced by both parties.
A.

Objections to Bear River's Statement of Facts.

In 29 numbered paragraphs,1 Bear River sets forth certain
alleged

facts

including
1

Bear

to which
River's

Perkins
failure

objects

on various grounds,

to cite

to the record, its

See Bear River's Brief, pp. 9-21.
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misstatements of facts, and its recitation of irrelevant facts.
The numbered paragraphs below correspond to the paragraph numbers
in Bear River's Brief.
3.
of

which

are

Paragraph 3 recites a number of alleged facts, many
unsupported

by

citation

to

the

accordingly, should be disregarded by this Court.

record

and,

In addition,

Bear River's knowledge that Perkins was involved in the "reckless
burning" of her Hillsden home in 1987 was never taken into account
in any way during its adjustment of her insurance claim on the May
1990 Fire at issue in this case.

(See Perkins Appellee/Cross-

Appellant Brief, pp. 19-20, ff 11-12). Moreover, the previous fire
at Perkins's Hillsden home was not an insured event, and Perkins
made no insurance claim for fire damage (R. 974).
4.

Perkins's inability to file a proof of loss with Bear

River within 60 days was never an issue in Bear River's adjustment
of Perkins's

claim.

Indeed, Bear River granted

Perkins an

extension in which to file the appropriate proof of loss forms.
Accordingly, the facts set forth in Paragraph 4 are irrelevant to
the issues now before this Court.
8.

Bear River implies that complaints by Perkins about First

General's work came about solely because Peterson allegedly refused
to bill Bear River for uninsurable work.

This is not the case.

(See Perkins Brief, p. 14, f 1).
9.

Bear River contends that Perkins instructed it not to pay

additional monies to First General Services.

This statement is

incorrect. Rather, Perkins and her sister informed Bear River that
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it should not pay any contractors without their authorization
(Perkins Brief, p. 14,fl2).
23.

Bear River again asserts that Perkins ordered it not to

pay First General.
B.

As noted above, this statement is incorrect.

Objections to First General Services's Statement of
Facts.

The numbered paragraphs below correspond to the paragraph
numbers in First General Services's Reply Brief.
6.

First General Services asserts that it only questioned

Perkins at trial about the Hillsden Fire because it was attempting
to elicit relevant information on Perkins's experience in hiring
contractors and whether she had ever requested a payment bond from
a contractor.

However, this information could have been just as

easily elicited without mentioning the fact that the prior need to
hire a contractor was because of fire damage.

The specific event

which necessitated her hiring a contractor, in this instance a
fire, was irrelevant to the evidence First General Services claims
it was attempting to elicit from Perkins—whether Perkins had had
previous experience with contractors.

Information regarding such

experience did not require First General Services's gratuitous
references to the Hillsden fire.
C.

Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden Fire and the Allegedly
Suspicious Nature of the May 1990 Fire Should Have Been
Excluded By the Trial Court As Irrelevant, Prejudicial,
Misleading and Inflammatory.

Bear River and First General Services argue that evidence of
the 1987 Hillsden Fire and of the allegedly suspicious nature of
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the May 1990 Fire were properly admitted because these facts were
relevant to Bear River's defense (See Bear River's Appellee Brief,
pp. 22-26; First General Services Reply Brief, pp. 28-40).

In

support of its position, Bear River asserts that its knowledge of
the Hillsden fire "could . . . have had an impact upon the manner
in which Bear River adjusted the May 19, 1990 fire."
Brief, p. 23; emphasis added).

(Bear River

It is undisputed, however, that

this knowledge had no impact at all on the adjustment of Perkins's
claim.

Thus, the evidence of the Hillsden fire, in addition to be

unfairly prejudicial, was irrelevant.

Perkins's arguments in

opposition to these contentions have been fully set forth in her
Appellant's Brief
repeated here.

(Perkins Brief, pp. 25-33) and will not be

Suffice it to say, the evidence of the Hillsden

fire and the allegedly suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire was
highly inflammatory and prejudicial. It cannot be doubted that the
introduction of such evidence was for improper purposes—to inflame
and mislead the jury.
In further support of its contention that this evidence was
properly

admitted,

Bear

River

points

out

that

other

courts

allegedly faced with the same evidentiary issues have permitted
introduction of evidence of previous fires to show that the
insurance company conducted itself in good faith in adjusting the
insured's claims. These cases are readily distinguishable from the
case now before this Court.
America, 780 P.2d

116

In Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of

(Idaho 1989), for example, the insurer

defended against a bad faith denial of insurance proceeds by
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contending that the "insured was responsible for intentionally
setting the fire." Id. at 116-117. The trial court permitted the
introduction of evidence of an arson investigation of the insured
following a previous fire.
introduction

of

this

The primary reason for allowing the

evidence was that

the

insured

himself

introduced this evidence in his case in chief, thereby opening the
door to the insurer. In contrast, Bear River has never contended—
as did the insurer in Pacheco—that Perkins intentionally set the
May 1990 Fire or was responsible in any way for that fire.
Moreover, Perkins strenuously objected to the introduction of
evidence of the Hillsden fire and of the allegedly suspicious
nature of the May 1990 Fire.
Bear River also relies on Rutledge v. St. Paul and Marine Ins.
Co..

334

S.E.2d

unpersuasive.

131

(S.C.

Ct. App.

1985).

It,

too,

is

In Rutledge, the trial court would not permit the

introduction of evidence by the insurance company that the insured
suffered

a

loss

due

to

fire

approximately

sustaining the fire loss at issue.

one

year

before

Significantly, the insured

collected fire insurance proceeds on the prior loss.

The South

Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the trial judge committed
reversible error in light of the insurer's defense that Rutledge
intentionally caused the fire at issue.

In contrast to Rutledge,

Perkins never collected or attempted to collect insurance proceeds
for the Hillsden fire. In addition, Bear River never claimed that
Perkins was responsible in any way for the May 1990 Fire. Indeed,
the issue of how the May 1990 Fire started or who started it played
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no role in Bear River's adjustment of the claim.

(See Perkins

Brief, pp. 18-22, ffl 9-13).
Bear River and First General Services further argue that
because the trial court limited the introduction of evidence
regarding the 1987 Hillsden fire and evidence as to who may have
set the May 1990 Fire, this evidence could only have had a
negligible effect, if any, on the jury's decision.

To the

contrary, admission of this limited evidence regarding the Hillsden
fire and the May 1990 Fire may have done more harm than if the two
issues had been fully explored.
evidentiary

rulings

permitting

Because of the trial court's
the

admission

of

unexplained

references to the allegedly suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire
and to Perkins's role in the Hillsden fire, jury members were left
to speculate freely. As a result, the jury could have easily, but
incorrectly, concluded that Perkins was responsible for setting
both the Hillsden fire and the May 1990 Fire in order to collect
insurance proceeds.
Finally, Bear River and First General Services disingenuously
argue that the probative value of evidence of the Hillsden fire and
the fact that the May 1990 Fire may have been intentionally set far
outweighs any prejudicial effect to Perkins. After all, according
to Bear River, the trial court precluded evidence as to who may
have set the May 1990 Fire and the jury was only permitted to know
that the fire was suspicious and intentionally set (Bear River
Brief, pp. 28-29).

The effect of this "limited" evidence on the
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jury is readily palpable: the jury could reach but one conclusion,
namely, that Perkins herself set the May 1990 Fire.
D.

Perkins Preserved the Issue of Whether the Trial Court
Erred in Allowing Bear River's Counsel to Improperly
Imply that Insurance Fraud Was an Issue.

Bear River contends that Perkins waived any right to appeal
the issue of "insurance fraud" because Perkins's counsel improperly
stated his motion for mistrial when he objected to the numerous
references to fraud in Bear River's opening argument. Bear River's
characterization of the discussion between the court and counsel,
however, is misleading. Perkins's counsel, Mr. Campbell, objected
to Bear River's counsel's (Mr. Heath) use of the terms "fraud,"
"defraud the insurance company," "fraudulent," and "real fraud"
during opening argument (See Perkins Brief, pp. 3-4, 15-18).

The

basis for this objection was that insurance fraud was never raised
as an issue in the case.

Because Mr. Heath improperly raised the

issue of insurance fraud, Mr. Campbell made the following statement
in chambers:

"I therefore stand on the motion, your honor, for

mistrial, or in the alternative to admonish the jury" (R. 5332) .
The court responded to Mr. Campbell's motion for mistrial by
stating: "The court will deny the motion for mistrial" (R. 5332).
As stated by this Court in Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P. 2d
235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "when an issue is argued before the
court and the court makes a definitive ruling . . . the issue is
adequately preserved for appeal."

Here, Mr. Campbell explicitly

moved for mistrial because of Mr. Heath's improper references in
opening argument to insurance fraud and fraudulent claims.
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The

court, by denying the motion for mistrial, made a definitive
ruling.

Thus, the issue of whether the court erred by failing to

grant the motion for mistrial was adequately preserved for appeal.
E.

Conclusion.

Opposing counsels' repeated references during opening argument
and throughout the trial to fraud, fraudulent conduct, insurance
fraud, the

suspicious

nature

of the May

1990 Fire

and the

possibility that the May 1990 Fire was intentionally set were
clearly improper and served no purpose except to unjustly prejudice
the jurors against Perkins.

These remarks fall well within the

definition of improper statements, that is, statements "plainly
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion or prejudice" in
the minds of the jury. Moreover, the cumulative effect of allowing
opposing

counsel

to

repeatedly

make

such

remarks

was

to

continuously remind the jury of inflammatory evidence, evidence
that was irrelevant to issues which were properly before the jury.
Because of the cumulative error in evidentiary rulings, a verdict
against Perkins was virtually preordained. Accordingly, this case
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
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II.
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO FRAMPTON'S
APPEAL OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD
Introduction,2

A.

Frampton filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to foreclose his
mechanics' lien against First General and Perkins (R. 390-393).
The trial court granted Frampton7s Motion and awarded $426.21, plus
attorneys' fees of $4,557.00, pursuant to Utah's Mechanics' Lien
Statute
First

(R. 1856, 1858), in favor of Frampton and against both

General

and

Perkins.3

Because

Perkins

had

asserted

a

counterclaim against Frampton for water damages resulting from
Frampton's negligent installation of a swamp cooler, the court
stayed

collection by Frampton of the judgment and

fee award,

pending resolution of Perkins's negligence claims against Frampton
at trial

(R. 813, 886-891, 114-118, 1196-1199, 1859).

During

trial, the court dismissed Perkins's claims against Frampton (R.
1291).

Frampton then filed a motion for additional attorneys' fees

incurred through trial, seeking a total of $9,464.42 in attorneys'
fees

(R. 1309, 1320).

The court denied Frampton's motion for

2

Frampton has misstated the standard of review with respect
to a trial court's determination of the reasonableness of an award
of attorneys' fees.
As stated by this Court in Govert Copier
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990):
"As a general rule, the trial court has discretion to determine the
reasonable attorney fees to be awarded and 'we will not overturn
the award absent an abuse of discretion.' Regional Sales Agency,
Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . ,f
See also,
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah
1988).
3

The Affidavit upon which the award of $4,557.00 is based is
found at R. 811-885.
It does not allocate fees between those
incurred to enforce the mechanics' lien and those incurred in
defending Perkins's counterclaim for negligence.
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additional attorneys' fees at a post trial hearing on August 5,
1993 (R. 5163-5166) and ordered First General to pay the judgment
in favor of Frampton in the amount of $426.21 plus $4,582.00 for
attorneys' fees (R. 1776).
Frampton now appeals the trial court's decision not to award
additional attorneys' fees.

The basis for Frampton's assertion

that the trial court erred in denying his request for additional
attorneys' fees is two-fold: (1) that attorneys' fees and costs
incurred by Frampton in foreclosing his mechanics' lien and in
defending

against

Perkins's

counterclaim

for

negligence

were

"reasonable;" and (2) that Utah's Mechanics' Lien Statute—which
allows an award of attorneys' fees for enforcement of the l i e n —
should be construed to permit an award of all attorneys' fees
incurred in litigation, including those which have nothing to do
with enforcement of the mechanics' lien itself.

Frampton's logic

is flawed.
Frampton first argues that total attorneys' fees of $9,464.42
incurred in foreclosure of the mechanics' lien and in defense of
Perkins's counterclaim were "reasonable," and on this basis alone,
he is entitled to have all his "reasonable" fees paid by Perkins
and/or First General.

It is axiomatic that any award of attorneys'

fees must be reasonable and must be based on evidence
record, irrespective of the basis for the award.

in the

Govert Copier

Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Frampton's argument, however, puts the cart before the horse.
Before determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the
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trial court must first determine which of the fees incurred are
recoverable under Utah law, that is, which fees were expended on
successful claims for which there is an entitlement to attorneys'
fees.

Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992).

B.

Frampton is Entitled Only To Fees and Costs Incurred in
Foreclosing His Mechanics' Lien.

Under Utah law, attorneys' fees may only be award if provided
for by statute or by contract.4

The Utah Supreme Court, in Utah

Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981),
held that:
[a] party is therefore entitled only to those fees
resulting from its principle cause of action for
which there is a contractual (or statutory)
obligation for attorneys' fees. (Emphasis added).
Utah's Mechanics' Lien Statute provides in pertinent part as
follow:
In any action brought to enforce any lien under
this Chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed
by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18.

4

Perkins previously set forth her argument regarding those
circumstances where a court may award attorneys' fees and cost,
namely, in cases where an award is permitted by statute or pursuant
to contract terms. The award of attorneys' fees by a court for
which there is a contractual or statutory obligation will not be
repeated here (See Perkins Brief, pp. 38-42).
In addition,
Perkins, in opposing First General Services's appeal for additional
attorneys' fees, has already presented her argument regarding the
trial court's discretion in determining whether fees are
"reasonable" (Perkins Brief, pp. 42-47). Again, Perkins will not
repeat the argument here except to point out that the same
reasoning applies to Frampton's claim that he is entitled to over
$9,000 in attorneys' fees.
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Where, as here, a fee may

be awarded

pursuant

to the

Mechanics' Lien Statute, the fee award is limited to fees expended
to enforce the lienholder's rights.

Moreover, the Utah Supreme

Court has made it clear that the plaintiff in a foreclosure action
must allocate fees between those for which he is entitled to
reimbursement pursuant to statute and those incurred on work not
subject to a fee award.

Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P. 2d 168 (Utah

1977); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d at 269. A plaintiff
cannot recover fees expended in defending a counterclaim in an
action to foreclose a lien and, indeed, is entitled to no fees at
all where plaintiff fails to "provide enough proof to enable the
court to distinguish the portion of plaintiff's fees spent in
prosecuting the complaint from the portion spent in defending the
counterclaim."

Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657

P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982), relying

upon Utah Farm Production

Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981).

This Court should

hold that the trial court erred when it failed to award Frampton
only fees and costs directly attributable to those expended to
enforce his lienholder's rights pursuant to the Mechanic's Lien
Statute.
C.

The Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Mechanics' Lien
Statute Is Narrowly Construed.

Frampton attempts to argue that the Mechanics' Lien Statute
permits a lienholder to collect not only attorneys' fees incurred
in enforcing a lien but, in addition, any fees incurred in
successfully defending against counterclaims.
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Frampton asserts

that such an interpretation of Section 38-1-18 is supported by the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764
P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).

Frampton's reliance is misplaced.

Dixie

State Bank involved the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to a
provision found in a note and security agreement. Dixie State Bank
is distinguishable from the case now before this Court because the
contractual provision for attorneys' fees at issue in Dixie State
Bank was much broader than that found the in the Mechanics' Lien
Statute.
As this Court recognized in Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713, 716
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), Section 38-1-18 of the Mechanics' Lien
Statute must be narrowly interpreted to include only those fees
arising

from

the

lien

foreclosure

action

itself.

This

interpretation comports with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992):
One who seeks an award of attorney fees must set
out the time and fees expended for (1) successful
claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which
there would have been an entitlement to attorney
fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims
for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.
Id. at 269-270.
This Court should uphold the trial court's award of $4,557.00
in attorneys' fees as "reasonable." In the alternative, the Court
should remand this case to the trial court so that it may determine
whether Frampton provided sufficient evidence to allow the trial
court to determine those fees associated with foreclosure of
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Frampton's lien from other fees for which Frampton is not entitled
to an award.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument and on the arguments set forth
in Perkins's Appellant Brief, this Court should remand the case to
the trial court and order a new trial because of evidentiary errors
committed in the previous trial.

In addition, this Court should

hold that First General Services is not entitled to any award of
fees and costs because it did not meet its burden of apportioning
such costs and fees and, further, that the trial court properly
held

that

First

General

Services

is

liable

for

satisfying

Frampton's judgment, including, an appropriate award of attorneys'
fees.
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DATED this 18th day of December, 1995.
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